I find that the unacknowledged (yet common enough) assumption that genes deterministically prescribe destiny as more or less isomorphic mappings of downstream biological development is unhelpfully shaping an already complex debate.
Yes, genes shape the probabilities of traits and – saliently – the preponderance of or bias towards certain illnesses and subsequently inferred social or institutional costs, but this is a limited view.
The degree of uncertainty in a predictive science built upon these axioms is deeply inflected by the extent to which the genetic code provides instructions for *growing* an organism but does not inexorably delineate all properties and traits or behavioural and pathological features that it might exhibit.
I think this is a significant caveat in the debate because the statistical methods of inference are built upon a suite of assumptions that bias a deterministic (and corollary) behavioural linearity which may not exist. Decisions made upon this data, insecure to surveillance and commercial interests as it may ultimately be, enshrine a specific relationship to determinism and genetics which generates its own incentives, motivations and weather systems of belief.