Context: Decoding Decision-Making: Insect Brains Are More Complex Than We Thought
I find it curious to consider how agency, volition, deliberation and the cognitive “inhabitation” of a form of life are slowly, begrudgingly being conceded to our ecological colleagues as something other than inevitable endpoint of human exceptionalism. Interesting, as a consequence, perhaps, to reflect how the construction (and endless reconstruction) of systems of meaning and belief are also themselves inhabited forms of life in and as language.
Why is this interesting? Because the science and totalising logics of descriptions, and (or as much) of the many-layered accomodations and affordances of proliferating descriptions of descriptions, is one which renders non-compliance and animal (or insect) otherness as a subject to-be-known but, again, only under the proviso that it, itself, remains a member of the set of things that do-not-know.
There is a faultline here – in and of language but also quite significantly in and of ourselves, our sciences and our technologies as ways of knowing.
Daedelus Kite 