Categories
Philosophy

The Business of Political Insecurity

Political insecurity mirrors the dynamics of cybersecurity in that the act of securing does not eliminate risk but displaces it into new configurations. In digital systems, firewalls, encryption, and patches reduce certain vulnerabilities but simultaneously generate others, leaving end-users and clients to absorb the cost of residual exposure (Anderson, 2020). Politics demonstrates the same recursive economy. Institutional decisions intended to resolve uncertainty redistribute it: identity becomes the locus where contestation re-emerges, sustaining the instability governance claims to neutralise (Giddens, 1991). From the perspective of systems theory, this is a predictable outcome. Complex systems rarely converge on final equilibrium; instead, they sustain themselves through the continual redirection of turbulence, transforming disorder into the feedback by which they validate their persistence (Ashby, 1956). In this sense, insecurity is less a malfunction than an essential circuit through which political and technological infrastructures secure continuity. Crucially, just as the cybersecurity industry has become a business model—expanding the surface of vulnerability in proportion to the effort spent closing it—political insecurity operates as its own form of economy. Advantage, power, and leverage are extracted from uncertainty itself, with actors feeding off the distress that their interventions propagate.

Seen topologically, this process is not a linear displacement but a folded recurrence: insecurity loops back into the system as the medium of its coherence. Political identities, like encrypted architectures, retain stability only by metabolising the perturbations that threaten to dissolve them. What appears as vulnerability functions more like a standing wave: oscillations between contesting positions that never resolve but instead create the field of intelligibility itself (Bateson, 1972). The purpose, then, is not resolution but replication. Entropic gradients—distress, discomfort, dissonance—are not externalities to be solved but the very materials upon which the system feeds. In this way, insecurity is converted into value, not as a human benefit but as the reproduction of the system itself. Just as cybersecurity endlessly inflates the space of vulnerability while profiting from its management, politics inflates insecurity as both problem and resource. Much like sporting leagues or tribal rivalries, the real function is not to determine who is best or what is right, but to preserve contest as the sustaining condition of systemic continuity.

References
• Anderson, R. (2020). Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. 3rd ed. Wiley.
• Ashby, W.R. (1956). An Introduction to Cybernetics. Chapman & Hall.
• Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. University of Chicago Press.
• Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Polity Press.

One reply on “The Business of Political Insecurity”

This “business” has been weaponised against itself in America, just now. Things which make this possible include that a general drift into, through (and essentially as) fractious political communicative phases is the default state complex system self-propagation.

This doesn’t mean politics, in anything other than its overtly destructive manifestations, needs to be a matter of adversarial conflict.

It does mean that many of us are unable to comprehend or acknowledge this anti-symmetrical enigma of critical dependencies generated around the largely unmanageable chaos that (the now) technologically-mediated political communications systems, themselves, invoke, sustain, normalise.

Tesseract dynamics: Zugzwang.

Like

Leave a comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.