My position is that the most consequential features of language, meaning, and coordination cannot be exhaustively defined without being distorted, and that this is a structural necessity rather than a theoretical shortcoming. Certain terms must be taken as primitive, not out of convenience, but because definition is itself a secondary operation, already dependent on relational structure. Meaning does not originate in fixed units or referents, but in patterns of difference that remain deliberately unresolved. What binds systems is not a central object, rule, or essence, but a maintained absence of closure that allows relations to persist and remain generative.
I am not proposing a model that outputs predictions, nor a framework designed to enumerate applications. Applications are contingent, unbounded, and historically situated. They are downstream effects, not first principles. The purpose of this framework is to explain why applications arise at all, why certain configurations stabilise, and why others fail. Requests for operational endpoints or canonical use cases misunderstand the level at which this work operates. It is not prescriptive. It is diagnostic. It addresses the conditions under which learning, coordination, and meaning are possible, without attempting to appropriate their instantiations.
Language and semantics, on this view, are distributed fields rather than containers of content. Value is never located at a single centre; it is always elsewhere, sustained through relations that repeat structurally without collapsing into identity. Coherence is maintained precisely because coincidence is avoided. Systems endure not by resolving this tension, but by holding it. Where dominant approaches seek certainty through definition and closure, I argue for restraint. Where optimisation promises control, I defend the interval that makes understanding possible.