Do we possess beliefs or do beliefs possess us?
Are the distributed, integrated information artefacts and systems of belief actually entities in their own right?
Are individual nodes in a networked, self-propagating information system really the storage components for the resilient continuity of an idea, a belief or an ideology?
Are the intrinsic errors (within constraints, functional thresholds) in information-encoding that provide a mechanism for information system adaptation, metamorphosis and evolution actually (also) the semantic and cognitive shock-absorption mechanism that inadvertently prepare individuals for disconfirmatory evidence?
Does the implicit error quotient of information transmission or encoding effectively immunise individuals against reassessment of inaccurate or disproven beliefs?
Information systems (as belief, other cultural artefacts) are biased by logic, mathematics and physics towards succinct algorithmic methods for maintaining continuity and contextual self-propagation. Individual nodes in the network are participatory and active within a limited range but the adaptive grammatical, information or energy-processing (i.e. computational) topology of the network is biased towards self-replication.
Daedelus Kite 