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systems theory

Good Karma, Bad Karma: The Cost of Keeping Things Running

Modern civilisation depends upon technical systems whose reliability and vulnerability are inseparable. Recent US disruptions expose how maintenance, adversarial interference and institutional incentives shape the same systemic dynamics. Order is never free.

Synopsis

Modern civilisation depends upon technical systems whose reliability and vulnerability are inseparable. Recent US disruptions expose how maintenance, adversarial interference and institutional incentives shape the same systemic dynamics. Order is never free.

Modern civilisation is an extraordinary achievement in the continuous management of things that can go wrong. Telecommunications, aviation, banking, energy distribution and satellite networks operate through vast arrangements of interacting technologies, institutions and people. Their apparent stability conceals an uninterrupted process of monitoring, correction, replacement and adaptation. We notice these systems principally when something fails, at which point the familiar questions arise: what broke, who is responsible, and when will everything return to normal? Yet technical fallibility is not an aberration in an otherwise dependable world. It is intrinsic to the complexity through which that dependability is achieved. Reliability and failure are not opposing conditions, but interdependent features of the same continuing process.

Recent disruptions affecting American communications and technical infrastructure bring this distinction into focus. A telecommunications fault, an unsuccessful maintenance operation or a software malfunction can propagate through dependent systems, interrupting services whose connection to the original disturbance is neither immediate nor obvious. The consequences emerge through time, but are not separate from the processes generating them. Detection follows disturbance; diagnosis follows detection; intervention follows diagnosis, often after the conditions requiring intervention have already changed. As Perrow (1984) demonstrated, tightly coupled systems with complex interactions are particularly susceptible to accidents whose consequences escape the boundaries of their initiating events. Greater technical sophistication improves local capabilities while extending dependencies across the wider field. We build systems to make life more dependable, then discover how much more there is to depend upon. This is the familiar predicament of problem solving in systems whose attempted resolution participates in their transformation.

Adversarial interference belongs within this picture, not as an explanation for every malfunction, but as another dimension of the same systemic dynamics. Powerful states attract espionage, sabotage and strategic manipulation, while their own conduct participates in generating the antagonisms surrounding them. An adversary need not manufacture technical vulnerability when ordinary operations, commercial dependencies and institutional fragmentation already provide opportunities. Nor does exploitation necessarily require direct intervention: uncertainty itself becomes communicative material, generating suspicion, competing explanations and political advantage. The distinction between accident, negligence and deliberate interference remains essential, but their consequences intersect within the same technical and political environment. Even an innocent fault can acquire an impressive collection of enemies before anyone has established what happened. The resulting communicative entanglement becomes part of the situation itself.

The American political environment adds another dimension. Money, lobbying, commercial influence and the circulation of personnel between government and industry create persistent opportunities for conflicts of interest, regulatory weakness and compromised institutional judgement. Foreign actors can exploit these arrangements, although the existence of such opportunities does not establish their involvement in any particular disruption. The difficulty is structural: when influence becomes a commodity, the distinction between legitimate participation and institutional capture becomes progressively harder to maintain. Engineers, administrators, security professionals and public servants continue working to preserve the integrity of these systems, frequently against pressures they neither created nor control. Yet their efforts participate in arrangements whose incentives can reproduce the vulnerabilities they are expected to resolve. The machinery does not need a villain in every department. Its ordinary operations are quite capable of making trouble, particularly where institutional incentives reproduce the conditions sustaining them.

Beneath these difficulties lies a fundamental asymmetry. Order is never free. Every sustained technical configuration requires energy, maintenance, materials and continuing communication. Local order exists through processes whose intrinsic dynamics include entropy production, disturbance and the propagation of consequences. These are not external costs imposed upon an otherwise independent system, but constitutive features of its operation. Thermodynamic entropy and semantic complexity are not interchangeable, although communication cannot escape its material conditions. Every intervention participates in the changing field of dependencies, disturbances and responses through which the system persists. Repairs, procedures, vulnerabilities and protective measures are not simply successive stages in an unfortunate chain of events. They are mutually dependent expressions of the same relational dynamics. Good karma, bad karma: the distinction belongs to our judgements, not to the machinery.

It is tempting to interpret the present condition of American institutions as the endpoint of decades of commercialisation, political competition and the conversion of public responsibility into private advantage. But complex systems have no obligation to arrive at the destinations we imagine for them. Their present configurations are waypoints, not conclusions. What follows emerges through the interactions, delays, incentives and interventions that continually constitute and transform them. The question is not whether technical failures can finally be eliminated, or whether adversaries will abandon opportunities to exploit them. It is whether increasingly complex societies can recognise that the order they construct and the instability they confront belong to the same process. Civilisation is not approaching some final condition of technical reliability. Its achievements, vulnerabilities, maintenance and failures are inseparable dimensions of what it takes to keep things running.

Recent Reporting: Technical Disruptions in the United States

The following reports document disruptions across American aviation, banking, communications and national security infrastructure during November 2026. They provide contemporary examples of the dependencies and vulnerabilities discussed above, without implying that the incidents share a common cause or constitute a coordinated attack.

References

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2026) ‘Nationwide ground stop: Questions and answers’, 15 November. Available at: FAA.

Perrow, C. (1984) Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.