Categories
Philosophy

consciousness and the human world

Every symbolic system presupposes an experiencing subject, yet no symbolic system can fully account for the existence of experience itself.

We have built an entire world of expectation, obligation, debt, responsibility, freedom, justice, crime, ethics and law around a phenomenon we cannot adequately explain. Consciousness is indispensable to the intelligibility of this world. Without experience there is no suffering, joy, intention, hope, fear, love, meaning or value. Yet consciousness itself is never directly available to communication. We cannot exchange experience itself, only words, actions, expressions, memories and other observable traces from which we infer the existence of an experiencing subject. We never communicate consciousness; we communicate about it. The person becomes the persistent relational vessel to which society attaches consequences, although whatever looks through that vessel remains inaccessible.

This is not merely a temporary absence awaiting better neuroscience or more precise philosophical language. Consciousness may occupy the same structural discontinuity that separates every local description from the distributed complexity of which it is itself a part. Every account we construct is necessarily local, assembled from finite observations, concepts and symbols, while consciousness appears to belong to the distributed complexity from which those accounts emerge. Any attempt to account for consciousness is itself an expression of consciousness, articulated through symbolic forms that cannot step outside experience to compare their descriptions with their ultimate object. The Cheshire Cat cannot explain the grin without grinning. This is an irreducible ambiguity intrinsic to communication: not an accidental defect, but the seam across which local description and the distributed complexity from which it emerges remain bound without ever becoming identical.

Human civilisation works because it does not wait for this problem to be solved. It stabilises identities, attributes intentions, records promises and preserves enough continuity for responsibility and recognition to persist. Law does not discover the consciousness behind the person; it constructs procedures for acting as though a sufficiently continuous bearer exists. Ethics performs a similar operation through vulnerability, agency and reciprocal recognition. None of this resolves what a human being ultimately is. It creates local coherence around an unrecoverable centre. We do not understand consciousness, yet without presupposing it nothing in our symbolic, moral or political world makes sense. The unresolved absence is not outside that world. It is the invisible organising defect around which the whole human world has formed.

What follows from this is not merely a philosophical curiosity, but a profound limit on every system of belief we have ever constructed. Science, law, politics, ethics, religion and everyday life all depend upon consciousness while remaining unable to account for it. Every symbolic system presupposes an experiencing subject, yet no symbolic system can fully account for the existence of experience itself. The point is not that these systems are mistaken. It is that they are all organised around the same irreducible absence.

Perhaps this is not a defect to be eliminated but a permanent feature of finite knowing. Whatever consciousness ultimately is, it remains both the condition that makes understanding possible and the one thing understanding cannot completely contain. Every civilisation, every philosophy and every tradition has, in its own way, organised itself around that strange horizon. Whether we approach it through logic, observation, contemplation or faith, we repeatedly arrive at the same silent boundary: the place where description yields to experience, explanation reaches its limit, and the world of persons, meaning, responsibility and belief begins.

One reply on “consciousness and the human world”

I sometimes wonder whether the inaccessibility of other minds is not merely a limitation of communication, but a necessary property of having a mind at all. Just as systems of meaning require ambiguity, including the possibility of nonsense, reversal and interpretive collapse, consciousness may depend upon a fundamental impermeability that makes experience possible precisely by preventing it from ever becoming fully available to another. Yet if consciousness is fundamentally unavailable to others, it is also never fully available to itself. There may be something intrinsic to its organisation that necessarily obscures its own operation, such that this opacity is not a defect of consciousness but part of what consciousness is.

This metaphysical cat vanishes as a strange yet darkly comic proof of a mischievously persistent non-existence, demonstrating itself precisely through its refusal to exist.

Like

Leave a comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.